Re: [dev] file integrity github project

From: Mattias Andrée <>
Date: Sun, 27 Aug 2017 00:19:28 +0200

On Sat, 26 Aug 2017 21:05:25 +0200
Laslo Hunhold <> wrote:

> On Fri, 25 Aug 2017 17:13:38 +0200
> Mattias Andrée <> wrote:
> Dear Mattias,
> > Each user could have a directory called pgp-keys and
> > could list those directories. This would allow us to store old keys
> > in a structured manner.
> >
> > An alternative is that the owner of a repo commits his key to the
> > repo under /.pgp-keys.
> this is absolute insanity! This completely defeats the purpose of it.
> If for some reason the server is compromised, the
> attacker can sign the fraudulent commits with his key and just replace
> the one for the corresponding user on
> PGP only works if the hosting is diverse, i.e. if the key is for
> instance hosted on every project member's homepage. Can't we just stop
> with this pseudo-security stuff?
> If somebody fiddled with the git-repo in some way, people would notice,
> because many many people have copies of the tree on their computer. If
> somebody somehow modified tags, or rebranched the repository, it would
> be noticed. This is much more logical security approach which is
> already in place.
> Still, I'm not against signing tags with PGP keys, and as always, in
> case I get something wrong, please let me know.
> With best regards
> Laslo

The user's must be able to find the appropriate keys some way the first
time, so suckless must at least have links to them. If suckless is
compromised these can be replaced. PGP keys only ensure that future
keys are not fraudulent as all new key should be signed by the old keys.
SSL certificates ensures that the PGP keys are not tempered with by
anyone outside suckless. Thus, hosting the keys one, when
it has HTTPS, is more secure that every ones private home pages outside that do not have SSL certificates.
Received on Sun Aug 27 2017 - 00:19:28 CEST

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